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This article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating to oil,
gas, and mineral law in Texas from December 1, 2019, through November
30, 2020. The cases examined include decisions of state and federal courts
in the state of Texas and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
I. DISPUTES CONCERNING CONTRACT FORMATION,
PARTNERSHIP FORMATION, AND CONTRACTUAL
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
A. CHALKER ENERGY PARTNERS III, LLC V. LE NORMAN
OPERATING LLC
In this case, the Texas Supreme Court was tasked with determining
whether a series of email exchanges was sufficient to form a binding con-
tract for the purchase and sale of $230 million in oil and gas assets.1 That
issue ultimately turned on the impact of a “No Obligation” provision in a
confidentiality agreement the parties executed prior to bidding, which the
supreme court found to supply binding conditions precedent to subse-
quent contract formation.2
The sellers were eighteen working-interest owners in approximately
seventy oil and gas leases in the Texas panhandle.3 The sellers conducted
a sale with bidding procedures that required all bidders to sign a confi-
dentiality agreement prior to gaining access to a virtual data room.4 The
confidentiality agreement contained a “No Obligation” provision, indi-
cating that, “unless and until a definitive agreement has been executed
and delivered, no contract or agreement providing for a transaction be-
tween the Parties shall be deemed to exist.”5
Pursuant to the bidding procedures, Le Norman emailed a bid of $332
million for 100% of the assets, along with a proposed Purchase and Sale
1. Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC v. Le Norman Operating LLC, 595 S.W.3d 668,
670 (Tex. 2020).
2. Id. at 673.
3. Id. at 670.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Agreement (PSA), and a sentence indicating the bid was “subject to the
execution of a mutually acceptable [PSA].”6 Another bidder, Jones En-
ergy, submitted a higher bid, and then Le Norman increased its bid to
$345 million.7 The sellers refused to accept any of the existing bids for
100% of these assets, and Le Norman declined further bidding.8
The sellers reached out to the bidders and sought bids for 67% of the
assets.9 Le Norman emailed a bid for $230 million and stated, “PSA simi-
lar to what we returned.”10 The email also indicated Le Norman would
not consider any counterproposals.11 The sellers accepted Le Norman’s
offer by email but stated it was “subject to a mutually agreeable PSA.”12
Hours later, the sellers returned a revised PSA to Le Norman and invited
further discussion.13 The sellers sent Le Norman’s private equity investor
a congratulatory email, and Jones Energy emailed the sellers stating it
“heard that we lost the deal again.”14
However, a few days later, Jones Energy presented the sellers with a
new offer, which the sellers accepted.15 But, Le Norman was not in-
formed of this.16 About a week later, the sellers and Jones Energy exe-
cuted a definitive PSA.17 “That same day, unaware of what had
happened, [Le Norman’s] general counsel sent the sellers a redlined
PSA.”18
Le Norman sued the sellers for breach of contract, contending that
their email exchange constituted an enforceable agreement.19 The trial
court held in favor of the sellers, and the First Houston Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that there was a fact issue as to whether
the parties intended to be bound by the emails.20
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered
judgment in favor of the sellers.21 The supreme court held that, by agree-
ing to the “No Obligation” provision in the confidentiality agreement, the
parties had agreed upon an enforceable condition precedent to contract
formation.22 As the supreme court acknowledged, most sophisticated
transactions are now conducted by email, and parties often protect them-
selves by stipulated conditions precedent to contract formation.23 “A









15. Id. at 671–72.





21. Id. at 678.
22. Id. at 673.
23. Id. at 672.
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party seeking to recover under a contract bears the burden of proving
that all conditions precedent have been satisfied.”24
The supreme court also rejected Le Norman’s argument that the emails
raised a fact issue as to whether a definitive agreement existed.25 The
supreme court acknowledged that some cases can present a fact question
regarding whether parties intend for a definitive document to be a condi-
tion precedent or merely a “memorial of an already-enforceable con-
tract.”26 However, the “No Obligation” provision in this case precluded
such a treatment.27
The supreme court also rejected Le Norman’s argument that the “No
Obligation” clause only applied to the formal bidding for 100% of the
assets and not to the subsequent informal emails regarding the sale of
67% of the assets.28 The supreme court disagreed because the subject line
“Counter Proposal” in that subsequent email chain indicated that the ne-
gotiations were a continuation of the prior negotiations, and because the
confidentiality agreement was still in effect.29
This case underscores the controlling impact that preliminary agree-
ments can sometimes have over subsequent contract formation. Purchase
and sale transactions in the oil and gas industry often begin with a num-
ber of preliminary agreements, such as confidentiality agreements. While
those preliminary agreements may sometimes seem perfunctory or like
mere gateways to initial bidding or due diligence, they may serve a much
more critical and controlling role if they contain applicable conditions
precedent to contract formation.
B. ENERGY TRANSFER PARTNERS, LP V. ENTERTAINMENT PRODUCTS
PARTNERS, LP
In this case, the Texas Supreme Court addressed “whether Texas law
permits parties to conclusively agree that, as between themselves, no
partnership will exist unless certain conditions are satisfied.”30
Energy Transfer Partners, LP (ETP) claimed that a partnership had
been formed between ETP, Enterprise Products Partners, LP, and Enter-
prise Products Operating, LLC (collectively, Enterprise) to place into op-
eration an oil pipeline from Cushing, Oklahoma, to the Texas Gulf
Coast.31 Under that partnership theory, ETP claimed that Enterprise
breached its duty of loyalty when Enterprise ended its relationship with
ETP and pursued a project with Enbridge instead.32
24. Id. at 673.
25. Id. at 676.
26. Id. at 673.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 676.
29. Id.
30. Energy Transfer Partners v. Enter. Prods. Partners, 593 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex.
2020).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 736.
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Enterprise claimed that preliminary agreements between ETP and En-
terprise disclaimed the formation of a partnership and set forth certain
conditions precedent to the formation of a partnership.33 For instance,
the parties entered into a confidentiality agreement that referred to the
pipeline as a “possible transaction involving a joint venture,” and stated
that “unless and until a definitive agreement . . . has been executed and
delivered . . . no Party hereto will be under any legal obligation of any
kind whatsoever . . . .”34 The “Letter Agreement” between the parties
similarly called the project a “proposed joint venture” and explained that
no binding obligations existed unless and until the parties entered into
definitive agreements.35 And in their agreement to reimburse ETP for
half the cost of the engineering work, the parties indicated that they were
“in the process of negotiating mutually agreeable definitive agreements,”
and that the agreement did not create a partnership or joint venture.36
The parties later formed an integrated team that sought shipping commit-
ments from shippers, prepared engineering plans for the project, and ex-
plored whether to retrofit an existing pipeline or to build a new pipeline
from scratch.37
However, after three rounds of failing to obtain sufficient commit-
ments, Enterprise ended its relationship with ETP and began negotiating
with a different company (Enbridge) to pursue the project.38 Enterprise
and Enbridge eventually entered into agreements, finished the project,
and enjoyed financial success.39
ETP sued, claiming that a partnership was formed between ETP and
Enterprise and that Enterprise breached the duty of loyalty owed to ETP
under that alleged partnership.40 At trial, ETP obtained a verdict for over
$500 million that was later overturned and reduced to zero by the court of
appeals.41
ETP argued that parties cannot, through contract language, preclude
the creation of a partnership until expressed conditions precedent are es-
tablished.42 Instead, ETP argued that under § 152.051(b) of the Texas
Business Organizations Code (TBOC), a partnership is established
through the parties’ conduct, regardless of whether they intend to form a
partnership and even if they express a subjective intent not to do so.43
ETP argued that the “totality-of-the-circumstances” test under the Texas
33. Id. at 740.
34. Id. at 734–35.
35. Id. at 735.
36. Id.
37. Id.




42. Id. at 740.
43. Id. at 737–38 (first citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051(b) and then citing
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202 cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997)).
Section 152.051(b) indicates that a partnership can be created “regardless of whether . . .
the persons intend to create a partnership, and a comment to the Revised Uniform Part-
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Business Commerce Code “controls partnership formation to the exclu-
sion of” common law tests and that the parties’ intent is merely “one
factor” to be considered.44 Thus, the jury’s verdict that the parties formed
a partnership should have been controlling.45
The Texas Supreme Court ultimately held that Texas law allows parties
to override the default statutory test for the formation of a partnership by
agreeing that they will not form a partnership until certain conditions pre-
cedent are satisfied.46 The supreme court further held that the prelimi-
nary agreements in this case between ETP and Enterprise did exactly
that—they set forth conditions precedent to the unintentional formation
of a partnership.47
The supreme court rejected ETP’s additional claim that Enterprise had
waived those conditions precedent.48 The supreme court held that “only
evidence directly tied to the condition precedent is relevant,” and evi-
dence probative of the statutory factors for formation of partnership
under TBOC § 152.051(a) “is not relevant.”49 Therefore, the only evi-
dence ETP pointed to in this case—the parties holding themselves out as
partners in marketing efforts and working closely together on the pro-
ject—was not relevant to the issue of waiver of definitive, board-ap-
proved agreements.50 Accordingly, the supreme court held that no
partnership had been created, the appellate court had properly found that
that the trial judgment should be reversed, and ETP should take nothing
on its claims.51
The significance of this case is the supreme court’s holding that the
statutory test for formation of a partnership was overridden by the par-
ties’ agreement that no partnership would be formed until certain condi-
tions precedent were satisfied. Another notable aspect of this case is the
holding that evidence probative of an intent to form a partnership is not
relevant to the question of whether the condition precedent had been
waived. This is one of two cases in 2020 whereby the Texas Supreme
Court enforced conditions precedent in preliminary agreements, with the
other case being Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC v. Le Norman Operat-
ing LLC,52 discussed herein. Together, these cases reflect the critical, en-
forceable role that express conditions precedent contained within
preliminary agreements play and the extent to which Texas courts will
enforce those conditions precedents—at least under these circumstances.
nership Act expressly states that “parties ‘may inadvertently create a partnership despite
their expressed subjective intention not to do so.’”
44. Id. at 740.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 740–41.
47. Id. at 740.
48. Id. at 741.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 741–42.
51. Id. at 742.
52. 595 S.W.3d 668 (Tex. 2020).
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C. COPANO ENERGY, LLC V. BUJNOCH
In this case, the Texas Supreme Court held that a series of emails relat-
ing to the purchase of an easement did not form an enforceable contract
because they did not satisfy the statute of frauds.53 The plaintiffs were
landowners in Lavaca and Dewitt Counties.54 “In 2011, the [l]andowners
granted easements to Copano[ ] for the construction, operation, and
maintenance of a [twenty-four]-inch pipeline on their properties.”55 In
2012, Copano approached the landowners, seeking to obtain another
easement to construct an additional pipeline.56
A Copano landman later contacted the landowners’ attorney, Marcus
Schwartz, “to discuss the proposed second easement.”57 Schwartz’s assis-
tant then emailed the landman to schedule a meeting between the two
and discuss the size of the proposed timeline and the type of gas it would
transport.58 Notably, the subject line of the email thread was “Meeting
with Schwartz.”59
Following the date of the proposed meeting, the landman emailed Mr.
Schwartz directly for the first time, copying Copano’s attorney.60 That
email stated:
Pursuant to our conversation earlier, Copano agrees to pay your cli-
ents $70.00 per foot for the second [twenty-four-]inch line it proposes
to build. In addition to this amount Copano agrees to address and
correct the damages to your client’s property caused due to the con-
struction of the first [twenty-four-]inch line.61
Schwartz responded, “[i]n reliance on this representation we accept your
offer and will tell our client you are authorized to proceed with the survey
on their property. We would appreciate you letting them know a reasona-
ble time before going on their property.”62 Copano was in the midst of a
sale to Kinder Morgan, and “[t]he second pipeline was never built.”63 The
landowners sued Copano and Kinder Morgan for breach of contract,
claiming that the email exchanges collectively formed an enforceable con-
tract to sell an easement for $70 per foot.64
The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that the emails “surely con-
tain an offer and an acceptance” but ultimately held that they did not
form an enforceable contract because they did not satisfy the statute of
frauds.65 The supreme court explained that essential terms, such as the
53. Copano Energy, LLC v. Bujnoch, 593 S.W.3d 721, 723–24 (Tex. 2020).









63. Id. at 726–27.
64. Id. at 727.
65. Id. at 728.
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easement’s location and size, were not present in the emails in a form
sufficient to demonstrate the parties’ intent to be bound by those essen-
tial terms.66 While the initial emails did discuss the location and size of
the pipe, the supreme court held that those emails could not supply the
essential terms because those emails were in anticipation of a future, in-
person meeting.67 According to the supreme court, these emails were
nothing more than requests to negotiate at a future meeting.68
The supreme court stated that, in some circumstances, communications
in advance of a meeting could conceivably supply essential terms if a later
writing confirmed that the parties subsequently agreed to the terms set
forth in the earlier, forward-looking writing.69 However, in this case, the
lawyer’s follow-up email did not set forth the essential size and location
terms, and it did not otherwise evidence an intent to be bound by the
terms contained in the earlier forward-looking emails.70 Thus, the land-
owners could not satisfy the statute of frauds.71
Copano serves as a reminder of the risks inherent in attempting to rely
upon a series of email threads to collectively form a binding contract,
particularly when some emails may be characterized as a forward-looking
request to discuss proposed terms. Pipeline negotiations are sometimes
fast-paced, and it is not uncommon for deals to be negotiated over a se-
ries of meetings and email exchanges. Copano illustrates the importance
of confirming all essential terms in a final writing once a deal has been
struck.
D. GREAT WESTERN DRILLING, LTD. V. PATHFINDER OIL & GAS,
INC.
In this case, the Eleventh Eastland Court of Appeals was tasked with
determining whether a faxed offer letter could form a binding contract
for the sale of an undivided 25% interest in oil and gas leases, despite the
offeror’s contention that certain conditions precedent in the letter were
not fulfilled by the recipient.72
On June 1, 2004, Great Western faxed Pathfinder a letter (Letter) in
which it offered to sell to Pathfinder a 25% interest in the Labor 1 and 10
leases.73 This 25% was “inclusive of any interests which [Pathfinder] may
be obligated to convey” to third parties with which Great Western knew
Pathfinder had a relationship.74 The Letter further provided that Great
Western would bill Pathfinder for 25% of its acquisition costs and that the
66. Id.
67. Id. at 729.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 730.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 731.
72. Great W. Drilling, Ltd. v. Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 11-14-00206-CV, 2020
WL 373096, at *2, *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 23, 2020, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.).
73. Id. at *2.
74. Id.
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parties would work on the details of a participation agreement “as soon
as reasonably possible.”75 Pathfinder executed the Letter and faxed it
back to Great Western within forty-eight hours, thus confirming its intent
to participate.76
After signing the Letter, Pathfinder requested an additional 3% inter-
est in the leases.77 In September 2004, Great Western sent Pathfinder a
proposed Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) providing Pathfinder’s share
of the lease acquisition costs and each parties’ respective ownership per-
centages.78 However, the parties had difficulty reaching an agreement on
certain terms of the JOA.79 Great Western consequently withdrew its of-
fer in a letter dated October 29, 2004.80 That letter also contended that
the June 2004 offer was contingent upon Pathfinder’s payment of 25% of
the lease acquisition costs and the execution of the JOA.81 That same
day, Pathfinder mailed signed copies of the JOA and a check for the lease
acquisition costs.82
After Great Western completed a successful well, Pathfinder claimed a
25% ownership stake, which prompted Great Western to file suit.83 A
jury found that the Letter was a valid agreement, and that Pathfinder did
not fail to comply with its terms.84 Great Western argued that the trial
court should have granted its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict because its offer letter contained two conditions precedent to con-
tract formation: (1) the execution of a JOA, and (2) the inclusion of Path-
finder’s third-party participants.85 In return, Pathfinder argued that those
terms were covenants, not conditions.86
The court held that the Letter offered 25% “inclusive” of the third-
party interests, but that it did not have any language such as “if” or “sub-
ject to” that would indicate the third-party interests were a condition pre-
cedent.87 Therefore, the court held this was not a condition precedent.88
Further, although the Letter recognized a need to negotiate a participa-
tion agreement “as soon as reasonably possible,” the Letter did not spe-
cifically indicate that Pathfinder’s ability to elect to participate was
conditioned on the execution of such an agreement.89 Further, the court
noted that “[P]arties may agree upon some of the terms of a contract, and
understand them to be an agreement, and yet leave other portions of an
75. Id.









85. Id. at *8.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *9.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *10.
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agreement to be made later.”90 The court also reasoned that there was
evidence that Great Western intended Pathfinder to be immediately
bound by the offer Letter because the Letter stated that Pathfinder was
required to make an election within forty-eight hours of receipt.91 The
court concluded that the Letter was a binding agreement between the
parties and that it was not effectively revoked by Great Western.92
The significance of this case is the holding that an offer letter formed a
binding agreement even though it recognized a need to negotiate a fur-
ther agreement to govern the subject matter between the parties.
E. MCGEHEE V. ENDEAVOR ACQUISITIONS, LLC
In this contract formation case, the Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals
held that an enforceable PSA was formed when a buyer received a signed
PSA from the sellers and attempted to tender payment, even though the
buyer did not sign the PSA and there were repeated issues with complet-
ing that payment.93
The buyer in this case sent a letter to two sellers, offering to purchase
certain surface and mineral interests in Reeves County, Texas, for
$185,000.00.94 The letter included a form PSA and general warranty
deeds.95 The letter instructed the sellers that they could accept the offer
by executing the documents and returning them to the buyer.96
The sellers each crossed out the purchase price in the PSA, wrote in
$200,000.00 instead, and initialed their changes.97 The sellers executed
and returned the modified PSA and deeds with no further changes.98 The
buyer did not return a signed PSA, but the buyer carried forward with the
title review permitted under the PSA and notified the sellers of a pro-
posed closing date.99
After the buyer finished its title review, the buyer sent each seller a
check in the amount of $100,000.00.100 The sellers refused to accept the
checks, contending that the PSA required payment of $200,000.00 each,
not total.101 The buyer disagreed, contending that the PSA defined
“Seller” by reference to both sellers.102 The buyer sent the sellers a sec-
ond round of checks for $100,000.00 each.103 Both sellers attempted to
deposit their second checks but they were returned due to a stop payment
90. Id. at *9 (citing Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1972)).
91. Id. at *10.
92. Id.
93. McGehee v. Endeavor Acquisitions, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 515, 527–28 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2020, no pet.).






100. Id. at 519–20.
101. Id. at 520.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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order.104 The buyer attempted to tender payment a third time by wire
transfer but the sellers refused the wire.105
The sellers filed suit seeking a declaration that there was no binding
contract, and the buyer filed a counterclaim seeking a range of related
declaratory relief.106 The trial court held in favor of the buyer on all
claims.107 On appeal, the sellers argued that the PSA was not enforceable
because the buyer failed to execute and deliver the PSA.108 The court of
appeals disagreed.109 The court explained that while intent to be bound
by a written agreement is ordinarily evidenced by signatures, such an in-
tention may also be evidenced by conduct that reflects that the party was
acting in accordance with the written contract.110 However, if the contract
makes it clear that a signature is required, a failure to sign the agreement
renders it unenforceable.111
The court acknowledged that the buyer’s cover letter instructed the
sellers that they could accept the offer by returning signed and notarized
originals, and found it was sufficient to require signatures to accept the
offer.112 However, the court noted that when the sellers changed the
purchase price, they in effect delivered a counteroffer to the buyer.113
Because the sellers did not include a cover letter repeating the signature
instruction, the buyer’s cover letter could not provide that signature re-
quirement.114 The sellers argued that the PSA itself indicated that it could
only be accepted by signature because it indicated the PSA “has been
duly executed and delivered on behalf of each of the parties and consti-
tutes their legal and binding obligations.”115 The court rejected that argu-
ment, characterizing this provision as stating that the PSA “has been”
executed and that it “constitutes” binding obligations, not that it “must
be executed . . . in order to constitute” a binding contract.116
The court then turned to whether the buyer’s actions constituted an
acceptance.117 Because the definition of “Seller” in the PSA included
both sellers, the court held that the sellers’ counteroffer required the pay-
ment of a sum of $200,000.00 in total, not $200,000.00 each.118 Therefore,
when the buyer tendered the first round of checks for the $200,000.00




107. Id. at 521.
108. Id. at 522.
109. Id. at 524.
110. Id. at 522–23 (citing Wright v. Hernandez, 469 S.W.3d 744, 757–58, 760 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
111. Id. at 523.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 524.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 524–25.
118. Id. at 525.
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valid and enforceable.119 The court rejected the sellers’ argument that the
stop payment order on the second round of checks defeated the accept-
ance because a fully-formed contract already existed by that time.120
The significance of this case is its analysis of the various stages of the
transaction and the requirements for establishing a binding contract. It is
not uncommon for mineral and royalty buyers to send a large volume of
unsolicited purchase offers through the mail, complete with instructions
for accepting the offer, an enclosed purchase agreement, and a deed. This
case is notable for its holding that the buyer’s instructions in its cover
letter constituted a prescribed manner of acceptance, and that the re-
peated attempts to pay the purchase price constituted an acceptance de-
spite the issues in completing that payment.
II. TITLE DISPUTES
A. CRAWFORD V. XTO ENERGY, INC.
In this case, the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the
“strip-and-gore doctrine” applied to a 1984 conveyance of seventy-six
acres, causing the conveyance to also include a severed mineral interest
underlying an adjacent 8.235 acre strip of land.121 Note that this case was
the subject of previous appeals through to the Texas Supreme Court on
procedural grounds.122 Those prior appeals focused on whether other po-
tential claimants were necessary parties.123
Mary Ruth Crawford owned 145.99 acres of land in Tarrant County,
Texas.124 In 1964, she conveyed the surface of an 8.25 acre tract of land
(Disputed Tract) to TESCO.125 That 1964 deed contained a mineral res-
ervation and surface waiver, reading as follows:
Grantors reserve unto themselves, and their heirs and assigns, the
right to all oil and gas in and under the lands herein conveyed [the
Disputed Tract] but expressly waive all rights of ingress and egress
for the purpose of drilling for or producing oil and/or gas from the
surface of the [Disputed Tract] provided that wells opened on other
lands may be bottomed on [the Disputed Tract].126
Subsequently, in 1984, Mary Ruth Crawford conveyed seventy-six acres
of land to the north and south areas of the Disputed Tract without any
mention of the 8.25-acre tract or the mineral reservation.127
In 2007, Crawford executed an oil and gas lease covering the Disputed
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 02-18-00217-CV, 2019 WL 6904298, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
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Tract.128 XTO pooled the interest in a unit and drilled and completed
four wells.129 However, XTO’s title opinion later indicated that Crawford
did not own any interest because the strip-and-gore doctrine applied,
causing the 1984 deed to also convey Crawford’s interest in the narrow
Disputed Tract.130 Following that, Crawford filed suit.131
The Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed the underlying law
and explained that while Texas courts construe deeds based on the par-
ties’ intent as expressed in the deed, the strip-and-gore doctrine can act as
an “aid in determining a grantor’s intent” regarding narrow adjoining
strips of land not described in the deed.132 The court explained that the
doctrine is merely a presumption and may be rebutted if “it clearly ap-
pears in the deed, by plain and specific language, that the grantor in-
tended to reserve the strip.”133
The court held that the strip-and-gore doctrine applied in this case,
causing the 1984 deed to convey the Disputed Tract.134 The court focused
its analysis on the requirement that the narrow strip of land must have
ceased to be of any benefit or importance to the grantor at the time of the
deed.135 The court reasoned that the Disputed Tract was of no practical
benefit to Crawford in 1984 because the 1964 deed had already waived
Crawford’s surface rights to the Disputed Tract.136 As the court ex-
plained, prior to the advent of horizontal drilling around 2002, minerals
were “wholly worthless” if the mineral owner could not obtain surface
access.137 The court also explained in a footnote that “there is no evi-
dence that pooling with other mineral interest owners was a possibility in
1984.”138
Crawford argued that the surface waiver in the 1964 deed was condi-
tional, pointing to the phrase immediately following the surface waiver
reading: “provided that wells opened on other lands may be bottomed on
the Disputed Tract.”139 Crawford argued that this meant the surface
waiver would cease if at any time Crawford could no longer open wells on
other lands that could be bottomed on the Disputed Tract.140 The court
acknowledged that “provided that” clauses can sometimes be interpreted
as a condition or the “functional equivalent of if.”141 However, the court
rejected Crawford’s argument, explaining that in the context of the re-
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vided that” clause should reinforce the waiver: the only means of physical
intrusion would be by slant drilling that would not invade the surface
estate.142
The strip-and-gore doctrine is sometimes (incorrectly) thought of as ap-
plying to thin, nominal, or negligible strips of land. The significance of
this case is that the strip-and-gore doctrine applied to cause a deed to
include a sizeable mineral interest that was not expressly described in the
deed. In addition, this case is significant in its application of the strip-and-
gore doctrine to an old deed by reference to drilling technologies that
were available at that time period.
B. PIRANHA PARTNERS V. NEUHOFF
In this case, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed a dispute as to whether
an assignment of overriding royalty interests conveyed an overriding roy-
alty interest in an entire lease, limited the interest to a single well, or
limited the interest to the lands identified in the assignment.143 In doing
so, the supreme court provided an analysis of several rules of
construction.144
In the 1970s, Neuhoff owned a 3.75% overriding royalty interest in an
oil and gas lease.145 For twenty-four years, only one well was completed
on the lease.146 In 1999, Neuhoff sold its interest to Piranha through an
oil-and-gas auction.147 The assignment contained multiple paragraphs
describing the interest conveyed, most of which relied on the description
provided in the attached Exhibit A.148 The supreme court described Ex-
hibit A as “not particularly helpful,” as it described the interest by refer-
ence to the well, by reference to the land, and by reference to the
lease.149
The supreme court indicated that Piranha erroneously relied upon a
number of rules of construction that were not helpful or not applicable.150
For instance, Piranha argued that the “greatest estate” canon should re-
solve this dispute because the assignment used the word “all.”151 The su-
preme court declined to determine whether the greatest estate canon is
applicable to an unambiguous agreement.152 Regardless, the supreme
court indicated that this rule would not resolve the dispute because the
full phrase read “all . . . right, title, and interest in and to the properties
described in Exhibit ‘A’,” meaning it would still be necessary to construe
142. Id.
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Exhibit A.153 Piranha also erroneously relied on rules regarding the clar-
ity by which an instrument must describe a reservation or exception.154
The supreme court indicated that these rules were not helpful because the
issue in this case was the scope of the grant, not the scope or effect of a
reservation or exception.155 Additionally, Piranha erroneously relied
upon the “construe against the grantor” canon, which the supreme court
held did not apply here because this was an unambiguous assignment.156
The Neuhoffs, on the other hand, primarily relied upon so-called “sur-
rounding circumstances evidence,” including descriptions that appeared
in the auction documentation.157 The parties offered conflicting interpre-
tations of these related auction documents.158 The supreme court re-
viewed this conflicting evidence in detail but ultimately concluded that it
failed to support either side because the documents contained provisions
disclaiming any reliance on them, and the documents instead expressly
directed the parties to review the assignment.159
The supreme court ultimately held that the assignment included all
overriding royalty in the lease, not just the wellbore.160 The supreme
court based its analysis on a “holistic and harmonizing approach” of con-
struing the language within the assignment and its Exhibit A.161 Specifi-
cally, the supreme court based this conclusion on several provisions in the
assignment that referenced an interest in the lease (as opposed to in a
well or lands) and language describing the interest as all interests Neuhoff
owned as of the effective date.162 The supreme court held that this re-
flected an intent to include all of the interests that were then owned by
Neuhoff.163
The supreme court also focused on another paragraph, which described
the assignment as including “[a]ll presently existing contracts . . . to the
extent they affect the Leases.”164 The supreme court noted that this lan-
guage limited the assignment to the well or the land, which “further indi-
cates that Neuhoff Oil conveyed its entire interest under the Puryear
Lease.”165 Other provisions also referenced the lease, including a provi-
sion indicating that the overriding royalty was payable out of oil pro-
duced under the lease and pursuant to the terms of the lease.166 The
proportionate reduction clause also referenced the assignor’s interest in
153. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
154. Id. at 748.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 749.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 751–52.
159. Id. at 752.
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the lease.167 As a result, the supreme court concluded that the assignment
conveyed the overriding royalty interest as to all production under the
lease, not just in the wellbore.168
The significance of this case is the supreme court’s analysis of auction
assignments and related informational documents and listings, and the
supreme court’s ultimate decision to base its holding on an extraction of
the parties’ intent based upon the four corners of the document. Moreo-
ver, while another notable recent Texas Supreme Court case construed an
oil and gas contract by reference to surrounding circumstances evi-
dence,169 the Piranha case is perhaps significant in its demonstration that
surrounding circumstances evidence is not without its limits.170
C. WTX FUND, LLC V. BROWN
This case involved a dispute as to whether a 1951 mineral deed con-
veyed the entire mineral interest without reservation, or whether it re-
served a royalty interest in whole or in part.171 Ultimately, the Eighth El
Paso Court of Appeals held that when the deed was properly construed
under the holistic four-corners approach, the deed reserved the entirety
of the royalty interest from the conveyance and thus conveyed only the
other attributes of the mineral estate.172 The granting clause expressly
conveyed “all of grantors’ right, title, interest and estate in and to the
leasing rights, bonuses and delay rentals in and to all the oil, gas and
other minerals . . . .”173 The court explained that “[b]y naming all three
interests individually—the leasing rights, bonuses and delay rentals—the
grantors conveyed each of these attributes.”174
The deed also included an “intended clause,” which indicated the par-
ties’ intent was to convey executive rights, bonuses, delay rentals, “and
benefits on any future oil and gas leases.”175 The final sentence in that
“intentions clause” expressed the intent to convey “the 7/8 leasing rights
or working interest . . . with all bonuses, delay rentals, oil payments and
all other rights and benefits . . . .”176 The court explained that by describ-
ing the leasing rights as a “working interest” and as a 7/8 interest (the
lessee’s historic share of production), this further reflected that the par-
167. Id.
168. Id. at 755.
169. See, e.g., Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.—USA v. Adams, 560 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex.
2018) (construing an express offset provision in a lease and concluding that surrounding
circumstances of the Eagle Ford reflect that “offset well” did not refer to a well actually
causing drainage).
170. See also Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 483
(Tex. 2019) (construing a consent-to-assign provision and refusing to consider surrounding
circumstances evidence of the parties’ contract revisions in negotiations).
171. WTX Fund, LLC v. Brown, 595 S.W.3d 285, 289 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet.
denied).
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ties did not intend to assign an interest in royalties.177
The court explained that the sharpest points of contention in this case
turned on the meaning of the phrase “benefits” from the “intentions
clause” and the phrase “shall not affect” in a so-called shall-not-effect
clause.178 The shall-not-effect clause provided as follows:
[T]his conveyance shall not affect any interest which any grantors,
heirs, or assigns, have or may have in the future to the non-partici-
pating 1/8th royalty in and under said land, but it shall never be nec-
essary for grantors, heirs or assigns, to join in the execution of any
instrument pertaining to any past or future oil and gas leases and the
grantors, heirs or assigns, shall have no right to any bonuses, delay
rentals, oil payments or other benefits under any oil, gas and mineral
leases which have been made or which may hereafter be made by
grantee . . . .179
The successors to the grantee argued that the phrase “shall not affect”
was too “unclear and ineffective to operate as a reservation of a non-
participatory royalty. . . .”180 The court disagreed, explaining that “shall
not affect” was written as a mandate that the conveyance “did not act on”
those ownership rights, and the court emphasized that no “magic words”
are required to make a reservation.181 The court also refused to interpret
the clause as a “subject to” clause, explaining that “rather than refer to
the rights of another party, the deed’s language specifies that the convey-
ance to grantee shall not affect grantors’ own rights to the non-participat-
ing 1/8th royalty.”182
The court also held that the term “benefits” did not equate with a con-
veyance of the grantors’ royalty interest, particularly when that word was
harmonized with the remainder of the language in the deed.183 The court
explained that the word “benefits” did not have a well-understood mean-
ing like “royalty” or “bonus”; rather, the word “benefits” was an inter-
changeable term that operated as a catch-all.184 The court explained that,
in this context, the term “benefits” appeared alongside the words “bo-
nus” and “delay rental” and therefore represented the economic benefits
of a mineral lessee, “but these benefits stand apart from the non-par-
ticipatory royalty interest which was expressly reserved or excepted by
other language.”185 Therefore, the court concluded that the “deed con-
veyed the leasing rights, bonuses, delay rentals, and development rights in
their entirety, but reserved the entire non-participating royalty interest as
a floating royalty (rather than a fixed fraction or fixed royalty) in favor of
177. Id.
178. Id. at 297.
179. Id. at 296–97 (emphasis by court omitted).
180. Id. at 297.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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the grantors.”186
The significance of this case is its analysis of the term “benefits” in the
context of rights to “bonuses,” “royalties,” delay rentals, and develop-
ment rights, and the court’s rejection of the argument that the “shall not
affect” clause was too unclear to reserve an interest.
D. FIVE STAR ROYALTY PARTNERS, LTD. V. MAULDIN
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
undertook the interpretation of a 1927 deed (Deed) to decide the nature
and amount of interest purported to be conveyed.187 Namely, the Fifth
Circuit was tasked with determining whether the interest was a floating
royalty interest or an interest in a fixed fraction of gross production.188
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit examined three specific parts of the
Deed: the granting clause and the second and third paragraphs.189 The
granting clause conveyed “a royalty interest of three-eights (3/8) of all . . .
minerals.”190 The second paragraph indicated the lands were currently
leased and that the royalty interest conveyed was a “three-eighths (3/8)
part of the royalty provided by said lease.”191 Likewise, the third para-
graph stated the parties understood the royalty interest to be “three-
eighths of one-eighth,” with the grantee receiving “three-eighths of one-
eighth” in the event minerals were produced.192 The third paragraph also
stated that the royalty interest conveyed would not include rentals, bo-
nuses, or control over leasing, and that the original grantors would act as
agents of the grantees.193
The Fifth Circuit held that the granting clause, if viewed in isolation,
appeared to convey a three-eighths fixed royalty.194 However, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the language of the second and third paragraphs, in
addition to the Deed neglecting to absolve the grantee of production
costs, suggested to the court that the parties did not intend to convey a
fixed royalty interest, but rather, “a right to receive royalties proportion-
ate to a held mineral interest.”195
In addressing the issue of the amount of interest conveyed, the defend-
ants argued in favor of the double fraction being construed literally, i.e.,
three-eighths of one-eighth, or three-sixty-fourths.196 On the other hand,
Five Star claimed the reference to “one-eighth” was “a proxy for
whatever [royalty happened to] be provided [for by] a lease so that
‘three-eighths of one-eighth’ [was] synonymous with a right to receive
186. Id. at 303.
187. Five Star Royalty Partners v. Mauldin, 973 F.3d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 2020).
188. Id. at 372.
189. Id. at 373.
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royalty proportionate to a [three-eighths] mineral interest.”197
To resolve the issue, the Fifth Circuit referenced the Texas Supreme
Court holding in Dils Co.198 and held that because the Deed purported to
convey “a royalty interest of three-eighths in the minerals,” combined
with “an equivalent reversionary interest,” the grantee effectively re-
ceived a mineral interest that included only a right to receive royalties,
with all other components inherent in a mineral estate remaining with the
grantor.199 The Fifth Circuit noted that, based on the specific facts of this
case, reference to one-eighth royalty was nothing more than a
placeholder for the royalty interest of any applicable lease.200
The significance of this case is the Fifth Circuit’s recognition of the the-
ory (sometimes called “estate misconception theory”) that when a deed
references an interest using double fractions, the second of which is one-
eighth, it sometimes means for the one-eighth fraction to refer to the roy-
alty provided in an oil and gas lease rather literally a mathematical one-
eighth.
E. CONOCOPHILLIPS CO. V. RAMIREZ
In this case, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted a specific devise in a
will to “all . . . right, title and interest in and to Ranch ‘Las Piedras’” and
held that it referred to an interest in the surface estate only and that it did
not include a mineral interest.201
This dispute pertained to a 7,016 acre tract of land in Zapata County,
Texas, and a portion thereof containing 1,058 acres that was referred to in
historical intra-family documents as the “Las Piedras Pasture” or the
“Las Piedras Ranch.”202 Following numerous conveyances over an
eighty-year period, title was generally vested such that various members
of the Ramirez family owned undivided mineral interests across the en-
tire 7,016-acre tract, and the surface estate had been partitioned into
smaller portions that were vested with different lines of the Ramirez
family.203
At the time of her death in 1988, Leonor Ramirez owned an undivided
one-half interest in the surface estate of the Las Piedras Ranch and an
undivided one-fourth mineral interest in the entire 7,016 family tract.204
In her will, she included a specific devise of “all of [her] right, title and
interest in and to RANCH ‘LAS PIEDRAS’” [sic] to her son, Leon Os-
car, as a life estate, with the remainder to Oscar’s living children.205 Leo-
nor then devised the residue of her estate to her three children, Leon
197. Id.
198. Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tex. 1957).
199. Five Star Royalty, 973 F.3d at 377.
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Oscar, Ileana, and Rodolfo.206
After Leonor died in 1988, her son Leon Oscar treated the mineral
interest as being shared with his siblings and joined with them in execut-
ing oil and gas leases.207 In other words, Leon treated Leonor’s will as
specifically devising only the surface in the Las Piedras Ranch to Leon,
not the minerals and the surface.208 After Leon died, his children filed
suit against EOG and ConocoPhillips, claiming that their remainder in-
terests were never leased and that they inherited the entire interest previ-
ously vested in Leonor.209 The trial court entered judgment in favor of
the children for almost $12 million against ConocoPhillips.210
The supreme court explained that, when construing a will, “the court’s
focus is on the testatrix’s intent, which must be ascertained from the lan-
guage found within the four corners of the will, if possible, and deter-
mined as of the time the will is executed.”211 However, “[w]hen a term in
a will is open to more than one construction, a court can consider the
circumstances existing when the will was executed.”212
In the supreme court’s view, the fact that Leonor’s will capitalized
“RANCH ‘LAS PIEDRAS’” [sic] and placed its name in quotation
marks signified that the term had specific meaning to Leonor and her
family.213 That specific meaning was revealed, in the supreme court’s
view, by a 1975 partition agreement and a 1978 exchange agreement that
were executed by Leonor and her children. Both agreements referred to
the 1,058 tract by the name “Las Piedras” and both were limited to the
surface estate only, thereby leaving unchanged the ownership of the min-
erals underlying the larger 7,016-acre family tract.214 In the supreme
court’s view, these documents “clearly designate the 1,058-acre tract of
land known as Las Piedras Ranch and Las Piedras Pasture as a surface
estate only.”215 The fact that the Ramirez family history of conveyances
since 1941 had separated the surface estate while expressly declining to
separate the minerals was “strong evidence that the family intended that
their ownership of all the estate minerals be joint.”216
The significance of this case is that the Texas Supreme Court held that
a devise was limited to the surface estate only, despite the fact that the
mineral estate was not expressly excepted or carved out anywhere within
the four corners of the will. The Ramirez opinion does not contain any
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than one explanation— the supreme court’s condition for considering
surrounding circumstances evidence. If this case is to be understood in
the abstract as holding that an unambiguous devise or conveyance of a
tract of land can be limited to the surface estate only, without any express
exception or limitation in the instrument for the minerals, then such a
holding may arguably favor upholding intent but could cause uncertainty
in land titles.
III. LEASE TERMINATION
A. ENDEAVOR ENERGY RESOURCES, LP V. ENERGEN RESOURCES
CORP.
In this case, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed a continuous develop-
ment provision that allowed the lessee to “bank” or “accumulate” the
number of days a well was commenced ahead of schedule and apply those
days to extend the deadline to drill the “next” continuous development
well.217
This dispute involved an oil and gas lease covering 11,300 acres in
Howard County, Texas.218 The lease contained a continuous development
provision featuring the following “accumulation clause”: “Lessee shall
have the right to accumulate unused days in any 150-day term during the
continuous development program in order to extend the next allowed
150-day term between the completion of one well and the drilling of a
subsequent well.”219
The lessee, Endeavor Energy Resources, LP (Endeavor), drilled twelve
timely wells under the continuous development provisions.220 Endeavor
then waited 320 days to spud the thirteenth well.221 Endeavor asserted
that this thirteenth well was drilled timely because Endeavor had accu-
mulated enough unused days in all of its previous wells to allow for that
period.222 Endeavor argued that it had accumulated 227 unused days over
the life of the lease, bringing its total permitted timeline for the thirteenth
well to 377 days.223
Shortly before Endeavor drilled its thirteenth well, the lessor executed
a new lease in favor of a new lessee, Energen Resources Corp.
(Energen).224 Energen filed suit alleging that Endeavor’s thirteenth well
was not timely, and therefore Endeavor’s prior lease partially terminated
and Energen’s new lease became the valid and effective lease.225 Energen
argued that unused days earned in a given term only served to extend
217. Endeavor Energy Res., LP v. Energen Res. Corp., 615 S.W.3d 144, 146 (Tex. 2020).
218. Id.
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Endeavor’s immediately following term.226 Endeavor had drilled the
twelfth well thirty-six days earlier than the 150-day deadline, and there-
fore Energen argued the deadline for the thirteenth well was 186 days.227
The trial court held in favor of Energen, and the appellate court af-
firmed, focusing on the phrases “next allowed” and “150-day term” as
pointing to an individual next well rather than the entire continuous de-
velopment term.228 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals, holding that the accumulation clause was ambiguous, and therefore
it was unenforceable as a special limitation (i.e., unenforceable to bring
about an automatic termination).229
The supreme court walked through the potential interpretations of the
provision and concluded that an analysis of the text itself was “inconclu-
sive.”230 For instance, neither side interpreted the phrase “150-day term”
to mean precisely what it says.231 The supreme court acknowledged the
court of appeals’ holding that the phrase “next . . . term” indicated that
only a singular term was extended,232 but the court also acknowledged
Endeavor’s “forceful rebuttal” that unused days from one term became
part of the “next” term, and because there will always be a “next” term
for unused days to roll into, that meant unused days may be carried for-
ward indefinitely.233 The supreme court indicated the phrase “accumu-
late” was inconclusive because it could reference both a gradual
accumulation over time or increases in general, whether sudden or incre-
mental.234 Ultimately, the supreme court called the textual interpreta-
tions “too close to call.”235
The supreme court also analyzed the parties’ non-textual arguments
and determined that both “advance plausible understandings of the pro-
vision’s commercial purpose,” but concluded that neither pointed to a
single objectively correct construction.236 For instance, Endeavor con-
tended that its construction represented a more sensible bargain, allowing
Endeavor to receive the benefits of exceeding the drilling timelines, while
still averaging about one well every 150 days.237 However, the supreme
court acknowledged Energen’s argument that the purpose of a continu-
ous development clause is not to achieve an “average” duration of gap
but rather to ensure there are no excessively long gaps.238 The supreme
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tie created by the Lease’s ambiguous language.”239
Ultimately, the supreme court concluded that the description of the
drilling schedule required to avoid termination was reasonably suscepti-
ble to more than one meaning, and therefore it was legally ambiguous.240
The supreme court indicated that “it has long been the rule that contrac-
tual language will not be held to automatically terminate the leasehold
estate unless that ‘language . . . can be given no other reasonable con-
struction than one which works such result.’”241 “Because the disputed
provision is ambiguous, it cannot operate as a special limitation under
these circumstances.”242
The significance of this case is that the supreme court declared that the
continuous development provision was legally ambiguous. This is notable
given Texas courts’ reluctance to declare that contracts are ambiguous.
Another notable aspect of this case is that, even though ambiguity gener-
ally opens the door to admission of extrinsic evidence, the supreme court
held that there was no need for extrinsic evidence here because this case
was resolved by the rule that ambiguous contractual terms may not oper-
ate as a special limitation.243 In addition, this case clarifies that the rule
regarding the clarity required to impose a special limitation applies not
only to the issue of whether a provision, when triggered, is intended to
impose a partial termination, but more broadly applies to also require
clarity in the drilling deadlines that trigger the clause allegedly calling for
a termination.
B. SAMSON EXPLORATION, LLC V. MOAK
In this case, the Ninth Beaumont Court of Appeals held, among other
things, that land associated with pooled mineral interests did not remain
in a unit after the leases terminated via foreclosure.244
T.W. Moak and Moak Mortgage and Investment Co. (Moak) filed suit
against Samson Exploration, LLC (Samson), Lucas Petroleum Group,
Inc. (Lucas), Bold Minerals II, LLC, and ETOCO, LP (collectively Bold),
alleging to be record owners of undivided mineral and leasehold interests
that entitled Moak “to participate in production of oil, gas, and other
minerals therefrom or from lands pooled therewith, or proceeds from the
sale thereof.”245 Moak further alleged that Samson, Lucas, and Bold op-
erated a pooled unit in which Moak was a record owner but that they
failed to account to Moak for production attributable to its share.246
“Moak asserted claims for an accounting, conversion, unjust enrichment,
239. Id.
240. Id. at 155.
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244. Samson Expl., LLC v. Moak, No. 09-18-00463-CV, 2020 WL 238538, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Jan. 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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negligence, and to quiet title.”247
Moak’s claims centered on the allegation that the defendants failed to
share revenue, royalty, and production from the unit with respect to six
tracts.248 Moak contended that because the pooling provisions in the
prior leases pooled the land, rather than merely the lease, the termination
of the prior leases did not terminate Moak’s participation in the pooled
unit.249 Thus, Moak contended that the pooling agreement in the leases
was independent of the life of the leases and outlived the foreclosure of
the leases.250
In deciding the issue, the Ninth Beaumont Court of Appeals focused
on the prior lessor’s ability to authorize pooling of its reversionary inter-
ests.251 The court explained that, when the prior lease was granted, the six
tracts were already encumbered by deed of trust liens.252 As such, even if
the pooling provision purported to include the land together with any
reversionary rights of the lessor, the lessor never acquired any reversion-
ary rights because the properties were foreclosed upon.253 Thus, because
the original lessors never acquired any reversionary rights due to foreclo-
sure and because the foreclosure terminated the leases, the original les-
sees had no authority to pool any interest in the land post-foreclosure.254
The court also noted that pooling is usually a matter of contract, yet there
was no evidence of any agreement between Moak and the mortgagees of
the tracts, and there was no contractual relationship between Moak and
Samson, Lucas, and Bold.255
The court acknowledged that in Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard,256
the Texas Supreme Court held that an interest remained subject to a
pooled unit despite the termination of the underlying lease. However, the
Ninth Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Wagner is distinguishable on
the basis that Moak was not a party to the original lease which authorized
pooling.257 The significance of this case is that a lessor and lessee do not
have the power to commit land to a pooled unit beyond the foreclosure of
a prior mortgage interest.
C. WHEELER V. SAN MIGUEL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
In this case, the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals reviewed,
among other things, whether a partition agreement altered the general
rule that coal and lignite ownership is held by the owner of the surface
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
250. Id.





256. Id. at *6 (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Tex.
2008)).
257. Id. at *7.
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estate and whether a coal and lignite lease had expired for lack of rental
payments.258
In 1954, a coal and lignite lease was executed covering the 2,210-acre
San Miguel Ranch.259 San Miguel Electric succeeded as lessee to this
lease.260 Through a series of conveyances, which included a Partition
Agreement (Agreement) at the center of this controversy, Wheeler ac-
quired ownership of the entire surface estate of the San Miguel Ranch.261
In 2017, Wheeler filed suit seeking to have the 1954 lease declared in-
valid.262 The terms of the lease indicated that, even if no minerals were
produced in a relevant period, the lease would “remain in force so long as
the [delay] rentals hereinafter provided for are paid.”263 Wheeler argued
that, pursuant to the Agreement, Wheeler acquired title to the coal and
lignite interests by way of partition of the surface estate and that San
Miguel’s failure to pay Wheeler delay rentals terminated the lease.264
The court held that the Agreement unambiguously excepted the “oil,
gas and minerals” from the effect of the partition.265 As such, the court
examined whether the Agreement contained a provision which estab-
lished whether the coal and lignite would be considered part of the sur-
face or mineral estates.266 Absent an express provision stating to the
contrary, Wheeler argued that a general rule, based upon the surface de-
struction test, states that coal and lignite within 200 feet of the surface are
considered part of the surface estate.267 The court held that the surface
destruction test was not dispositive in this case because the Agreement
provided an express definition of “oil, gas and minerals,” which expressly
included, among other substances, coal and lignite.268 Because the Agree-
ment did not affect the interests in coal or lignite, the court held that
Wheeler was not entitled to payment of delay rentals.269
The court went on to uphold the trial court’s directed verdict against
the plaintiff’s contentions that the required delay rentals were not made
according to the lease.270 The lessee had made payments consistent with
alternative means that were proper under the lease, including continuing
to pay a deceased owner until proper notice of the change in
258. Wheeler v. San Miguel Elec. Coop., Inc., 610 S.W.3d 60, 61 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2020, pet. denied).
259. Id. at 63.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 64.
263. Id. at 69.
264. Id. at 64.
265. Id. at 65–66 (“The parties hereto desire to partition and/or exchange the surface
estate . . . and desire to except the oil, gas, and mineral estate . . .”) (Paragraph 2 was
labeled “Partition of Surface Estate Only”) (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 66.
267. Id. (citing Reed v. Wylie (Reed II), 597 S.W.2d 743, 747–48 (Tex. 1980)).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 67.
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166 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 7
ownership.271
The significance of this case is the court’s interpretation that coal and
lignite were components of the mineral estate on the basis of the parties’
express, agreed-upon definition of “oil, gas and minerals,” as opposed to
basing ownership on the surface destruction test.
IV. LESSEE’S EXPRESS AND IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS
A. MARTIN V. ROSETTA RESOURCES OPERATING, LP
This case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of an express
offset provision in an oil and gas lease.272 There were two leases (the
Martin Leases) involved, each of which contained the following identical
offset provision within the addendum:
Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, it is fur-
ther agreed that in the event a well is drilled on or in a unit contain-
ing part of this acreage or is drilled on acreage adjoining this Lease,
the Lessor [sic], or its agent(s) shall protect the Lessee’s [sic] undril-
led acreage from drainage and in the opinions of reasonable and pru-
dent operations, drainage is occurring on the un-drilled acreage,
even though the draining well is located over three hundred thirty
(330) feet from the un-drilled acreage, the Lessee shall spud an offset
well on said un-drilled acreage or on a unit containing said acreage
within twelve (12) months from the date the drainage began or re-
lease the acreage which is un-drilled or is not a part of a unit which is
held by production.273
Rosetta Resources Operating, LP (Rosetta) and Newfield established
the Martin Unit, which contained a portion of the Martin Leases, and
drilled the “GU-1 Well.”274 Newfield later established the unrelated
nearby “Simmons Unit” and drilled the “Simmons-1 Well.”275 Martin
filed suit against both Newfield and Rosetta, arguing that each of these
wells triggered the offset obligations under the Martin Leases.276 In 2018,
the claims against Newfield made their way up to the Thirteenth Corpus
Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals.277 In that prior case, the court held
that this offset provision was not triggered by Newfield’s drilling of the
nearby Simmons-1 Well because the Simmons Unit was not “adjoining”
the Martin leases.278 The Martins amended their petition against Rosetta
to claim that Rosetta’s obligations were triggered not by the Simmons-1
Well, but instead, by the drilling of the GU-1 Well in the Martin Unit.279
271. Id.
272. Martin v. Rosetta Res. Operating, LP, No. 13-19-00431-CV, 2020 WL 5887566, at





277. Martin v. Newfield Expl. Co., No. 13-17-00104-CV, 2018 WL 1633574, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 5, 2018, pet. denied).
278. Id. at *3.
279. Martin, 2020 WL 5887566, at *2.
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The trial court held in favor of Rosetta and this appeal followed.280
Rosetta argued that all of its obligations under this express lease provi-
sion were triggered only if and when two conditions both occur: (1) a well
is drilled on or in a unit containing the lease or on adjoining lands, and
(2) that same well must also be causing drainage as determined by “the
opinions of reasonable and prudent operations.”281 Rosetta argued that,
though the GU-1 well satisfied the first condition, it did not satisfy the
second because there was no allegation that the GU-1 was causing
drainage.282
The court disagreed, construing the provision as imposing two indepen-
dent obligations: a general duty to “protect” from drainage and an addi-
tional duty to “spud an offset well.”283 The court construed the first
obligation as being triggered only by the drilling of a well within the de-
fined proximity to the Martin leases.284 The court held that the presence
of drainage is irrelevant under the lease with respect to that general
duty.285 Unlike the prior case, it was undisputed that the GU-1 well was
located “on or in a unit containing part of” the Martin Leases.286 There-
fore, the court held that this general duty to protect was triggered when
the GU-1 Well was drilled within the Martin Unit.287
The court then turned to the additional independent express duty to
spud an offset well.288 The court rejected Rosetta’s interpretation that the
duty to spud an offset well is limited to situations where “in the opinions
of reasonable and prudent operations, drainage is occurring.”289 As the
court explained, this phrase does not itself contain conditional language,
such as “if” or “in the event.”290 Regardless, the court pointed out that it
was undisputed that the Simmons-1 Well was draining the undrilled por-
tions of the Martin Leases.291 The court held that it was immaterial that
the general duty to protect and the independent duty to spud an offset
well were triggered by different wells.292 Therefore, the court held that
Rosetta was obligated to either spud an offset well or release the undril-
led acreage.293
It is difficult to define a narrow and clear abstract significant point of
law from this case. Indeed, the court pointed out that the provision at
issue “suffers from both a lack of accuracy and a lack of clarity.”294 At
280. Id.
281. Id. at *3.
282. Id. at *5.
283. Id. at *3, n.5.
284. Id. at *4.
285. Id. at *5.
286. Id. at *4.
287. Id. at *5.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *3.
291. Id. at *5.
292. Id.
293. Id. at *6.
294. Id. at *3.
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any rate, the case serves as a cautionary reminder to lessees that, just
because an express offset provision references the standard of a reasona-
ble prudent operator, that does not necessarily serve as a significant limi-
tation or condition precedent to the lessee’s obligations.
V. EXECUTIVE RIGHTS AND DUTIES
A. GEARY V. TWO BOW RANCH LTD. PARTNERSHIP
In this case, the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed the
nature of a deed provision giving the grantee of the property the power to
“control the executory rights pertaining to the minerals” and whether the
grantee’s successor could be held liable for a claim for breach of duties
owed by the holder of executive interests.295
This case involved a 1981 warranty deed that conveyed both 100% of
the surface estate and an undivided one-half interest in the minerals, and
expressly reserved and excepted an undivided one-half of the minerals.296
The deed also contained what the court labeled a “[p]rovisional
[a]uthority” clause, stating the “Grantee may control the executory rights
pertaining to the minerals provided the Grantors and Grantee share
equally in any and all proceeds related thereto.”297 Several years later,
the grantee sold its interest to a purchaser, and that purchaser later sold
its interest to Two Bow Ranch.298
Two Bow Ranch executed an oil and gas lease in 2011 in exchange for a
lease bonus of $174,498.00.299 The grantors of the 1981 deed contended
that Two Bow should share that bonus payment with them pursuant to
the “provisional authority” clause.300 The grantors asserted multiple the-
ories they contended reached that result, including breach of contractual
and breach of duties allegedly owed by the holder of executive rights.301
They argued that if the 2011 lease covered only Two Bow’s interest, then
Two Bow breached a duty to lease the grantors’ interests as an executive
owner. But, if the 2011 lease covered the entire mineral estate, then Two
Bow breached a duty to share the lease bonus payment with them.302
The Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the deed did not
convey an “ownership” interest in the executive estate relating to the
grantors’ reserved minerals.303 The appellate court first noted that the
deed described “the property” being conveyed as one-half of the minerals
“and related executory rights and interests associated therewith . . . .”304
295. Geary v. Two Bow Ranch Ltd. P’ship, No. 04-18-00610-CV, 2020 WL 354763, at *1
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 22, 2020, pet. filed).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at *1–2.
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The court explained that this language meant that the only executive
rights being conveyed were the one-half executive rights that were “re-
lated” to the one-half mineral interest being conveyed.305 Next, the court
noted that the 1981 deed also expressly reserved and excepted a one-half
mineral interest and its “related” executive rights.306 The court indicated
that these provisions collectively meant that the grant did not include the
executive interest covering the grantors’ one-half mineral interest.307 In-
stead, the court characterized the provisional authority clause as provid-
ing the grantee a “conditional permission” to exercise the executive
rights, but no obligation or duty to do so.308 As a result, the grantee had
the contractual power to grant a lease covering only its one-half interest,
or it could lease the entire mineral interest provided that it shared in the
benefits.309
The court then turned to whether the “provisional authority” passed
with the property to subsequent grantees.310 The court held that the suc-
cessors and assigns forever provision was not applicable because it ex-
pressly pertained to “the Property,” whereas the provisional authority
was a contractual authority.311 Moreover, “the Property,” as defined in
the deed, did not include the grantor’s reserved interest, and therefore, it
could not be interpreted as including the provisional authority.312 Also,
the provisional authority clause itself did not indicate that the optional
power was assignable.313 The grantors argued that the provisional author-
ity passed to the successors because contract rights are generally assigna-
ble.314 The court held there was no need to decide that issue because,
even if the provisional authority was assignable as a contract right, the
assignments from Two Bow’s predecessors did not assign that right.315
Finally, the court held that Two Bow was not obligated to share its
lease bonus with the grantors.316 First, Two Bow could not lease a greater
mineral estate than it owned.317 Further, the lease Two Bow executed
contained a lesser interest clause (or proportionate reduction clause),
meaning the lease expressly only covered Two Bow’s interest, and there-
fore, the bonus paid to Two Bow was attributable only to Two Bow’s one-
half mineral interest.318
The significance of this case is the court’s analysis of the nature of the
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breach of the alleged duties owned by an executive to non-executive in-
terests. Executive rights can place significant duties on their holder with
the potential for significant liability for breach.319
VI. ROYALTY DISPUTES
A. DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION CO., LP V. SHEPPARD
This case involves “highly unique royalty provisions” in lease forms
prevalent during the shale boom in the Eagle Ford area.320 The leases
contained the following “add to proceeds” provision:
If any disposition, contract or sale of oil or gas shall include any re-
duction or charge for the expenses or costs of production, treatment,
transportation, manufacturing, process or marketing of the oil or gas,
then such deduction, expense or cost shall be added to the market
value or gross proceeds so that Lessor’s royalty shall never be
chargeable directly or indirectly with any costs or expenses other
than its pro rata share of severance or production taxes.321
Another provision in the addendum indicated that royalties “shall never
bear or be charged with, either directly or indirectly, any part of the costs
or expenses of” several enumerated categories of postproduction costs.322
The royalty owners argued that these lease provisions required the
lessee to add any “reduction or charge” that was included in any “disposi-
tion, contract or sale of oil or gas” to the lessee’s gross proceeds before
calculating royalties.323 The lessors argued that a wide variety of the
lessee’s purchase agreements, purchase statements, processing arrange-
ments, and other instruments reflected reductions or charges, and there-
fore, they should have been added to the lessee’s gross proceeds prior to
calculating the lessors’ royalties.324
The lessees argued that the controlling language in the leases was the
royalty provision indicating that royalties were to be paid on the basis of
“gross proceeds at the point of sale.”325 The lessees argued that this
phrase established a valuation point at the point of sale, and that the re-
ductions or charges at issue in this case were irrelevant because they were
incurred downstream of the point of sale.326
319. See, e.g., Tex. Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 534 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2017) aff’d, 572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. 2019); Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd., 352
S.W.3d 479, 491 (Tex. 2011); KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 81–82 (Tex.
2015).
320. Devon Energy Prod. Co., LP v. Sheppard, No. 13-19-00036-CV, 2020 WL 6164467,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 22, 2020, pet. filed) (author Austin Brister
represented the appellees in this case at the trial court and appellate court levels and is
continuing representation of the appellees at the Texas Supreme Court where petition for
review has been filed).
321. Id. at *2.
322. Id.




2021] Oil, Gas and Mineral Law 171
The lessors and lessees submitted a joint stipulation to the court, identi-
fying twenty-three different scenarios for the court’s consideration.327
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lessors, and this
appeal followed.328
The appellate court reviewed the “highly unique royalty provisions” in
the underlying leases and concluded that it was “exceptionally broad, and
there [was] nothing in the leases suggesting that [it] [was] limited to pre-
point-of-sale expenses.”329 The court further explained that the initial
royalty clause indicated that “royalty [was] to be initially based on the
[lessees’] gross proceeds (before [this unique additional provision was]
applied).”330 The court explained that, if it were to hold that royalties
were due only on gross proceeds, then the court would be rendering this
additional “add to proceeds” provision meaningless.331
The court also explained that this unique provision differs “signifi-
cantly” from a mere “no-deducts” clause, as it does not concern deduc-
tions made to the royalty; rather, it focuses on the dispositions and sales
contracts, and it applies if they contain a “reduction or charge” for such
expenses.332 Moreover, the phrase indicating that the royalty shall never
be “directly or indirectly” charged with such costs reflected an intent that
the royalty should not be reduced where “a downstream sales price is
reduced to account for costs incurred or anticipated by the purchaser.”333
Ultimately, the court concluded that this unique language reflected the
parties’ intent to base the royalty on more than mere gross proceeds.334
The court coined this a “proceeds plus” royalty.335 The court held that
this language requires the lessee to add to its gross proceeds any reduc-
tion or charge that is included in a disposition, contract, or sale of oil and
gas, so long as the charge is for one of categories enumerated within the
lease addendum.336
The significance of this case is the court’s analysis of a unique form of
oil and gas lease that appeared in the Eagle Ford area around 2011, the
court’s treatment of the valuation point and royalty base concepts, and
the court’s analysis of the so-called “add back” provision.
B. BLUESTONE NATURAL RESOURCES II, LLC V. NETTYE ENGLER
ENERGY, LP
This case involves a dispute determining whether a deed granting a
non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) was properly construed as al-
327. Id.
328. Id. at *4.
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lowing the deduction of a proportionate share of post-production costs.337
The owner of an NPRI contended that a 1986 deed creating the NPRI
interest contained language that prohibited the deduction of post-produc-
tion costs.338 The 1986 deed contained the following language:
Grantor . . . shall be entitled to receive . . . a free one-eighth (1/8) of
gross production of any such oil, gas or other mineral said amount to
be delivered to Grantor’s credit, free of cost in the pipe line, if any,
otherwise free of cost at the mouth of the well or mine . . .339
In 2004, BlueStone’s predecessors leased the tract and drilled numerous
producing wells.340 BlueStone’s predecessors incurred a number of post-
production costs, but that predecessor did not pass those costs onto the
NPRI owner.341 In 2016, BlueStone acquired these leasehold interests
and began to deduct from the NPRI a share of BlueStone’s post-produc-
tion costs for transportation, gathering, and compression.342 The NPRI
owner filed suit.343 The trial court granted the NPRI owner’s motion for
summary judgment, and this appeal followed.344
On appeal, BlueStone argued that the 1986 deed’s use of the phrase “in
the pipe line” indicated that the royalty was to be valued at the pipeline
and therefore, was subject to post-production costs.345 BlueStone cited
the recent Texas Supreme Court case, Burlington Resources Oil & Gas
Co. LP v. Texas Crude Energy, LLC,346 which held that the phrase “into
the pipelines . . . with which the wells may be connected” was tantamount
to the phrase “at the well,” thereby establishing a valuation point that
requires a royalty interest owner to bear post-production costs.347
The NPRI attempted to distinguish Burlington, arguing that Burlington
did not broadly hold that “into the pipeline” sets a valuation point at the
wellhead.348 The NPRI owner instead argued that the controlling factor
in Burlington was the fact the instrument referenced pipelines that are
“connected” to the well.349 The Bluestone court disagreed, stating Bur-
lington “did in fact focus heavily on the singular phrase ‘into the
pipeline.’”350
The NPRI owner also argued that omitting the phrase “connected to
the well” reflects that the parties to the 1986 deed were referring to a
337. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC v. Nettye Engler Energy, LP, No. 02-19-00236-CV,
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major pipeline downstream, not merely a gathering system connected to
the well.351 The Bluestone court rejected that argument as well, pointing
to multiple resources indicating that a gathering system is a type of
pipeline.352
Additionally, the NPRI owner argued that, because the two phrases
“free of cost in the pipe line” and “free of cost at the mouth of the well”
are separated by the word “otherwise,” they are mutually exclusive.353
The NPRI owner further argued that the second phrase refers to gas with
a valuation point at the mouth of the well, and therefore, the first phrase
must refer to oil and a valuation point somewhere other than the well-
head.354 The Bluestone court rejected that interpretation.355 Instead, the
court construed the word “otherwise” as simply meaning that the valua-
tion point is at the pipeline if there is a pipeline, otherwise the valuation
point is at the mouth of the well.356
The NPRI owner also attempted to draw several analogies between the
1986 deed and the Hyder case.357 The NPRI owner cited Hyder in arguing
that the phrase “cost free” in the 1986 deed means free of post-produc-
tion costs.358 The appellate court rejected that comparison, noting that
Hyder was not based solely on the phrase “cost free” but was instead
“focused specifically” on the parenthetical that followed, which read
“cost-free (except only its portion of production taxes).”359 Because that
parenthetical did not appear in the 1986 deed, the phrase “cost free” was
given its ordinary meaning, being that the royalty is to be free of produc-
tion costs but subject to a proportionate share of post-production costs.360
The BlueStone court also rejected the argument that the 1986 deed’s
use of the phrase “a free one-eighth (1/8) of gross production” brought
the 1986 deed in line with Hyder.361 The court explained that Hyder held
that the phrase “free” in a royalty provision typically refers only to pro-
duction costs and not post-production costs.362 The BlueStone court ex-
plained that the 1986 deed did not express a contrary intent, as the word
“free” appeared in multiple other locations in the context of production
costs, not post-production costs.363 Moreover, in the phrase “free of cost
at the mouth of the well,” the reference to the mouth of the well suggests
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The significance of this case is its interpretation and extension of the
holding in Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Texas Crude En-
ergy, LLC365 in relation to the phrase “into the pipeline” in a royalty
provision. This case is also notable given its discussion of Chesapeake Ex-
ploration, LLC v. Hyder.366
VII. EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE
A. JATEX OIL & GAS EXPLORATION LP V. NADEL & GUSSMAN
PERMIAN, LLC
In this case, the Eleventh Eastland Court of Appeals held that the
Property Owner Rule did not extend to the valuation of mineral reserves
because such a valuation is based on matters of a technical or specialized
nature.367 As such, valuation of mineral reserves generally requires ex-
pert testimony under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.368
Jatex was a non-operator and Nadel & Gussman Permian (NGP) was
an operator.369 The parties were subject to a joint operating agreement
(JOA).370 Jatex alleged that NPG improperly included Jatex in a deepen-
ing project and NPG erroneously assessed charges to Jatex’s account for
the project.371 Jatex argued that this was improper because Jatex did not
elect to participate in that project, and under the JOA, a written consent
election was required to include a non-operator in the operation.372 Jatex
alleged that those erroneous charges caused a bank to foreclose on
Jatex’s mineral leasehold interests, which the bank purchased at the fore-
closure sale for $1.5 million.373
Jatex filed suit against NGP, claiming that NPG breached the parties’
JOA by failing to act as a reasonably prudent operator.374 Jatex filed a
motion for summary judgment supported by a declaration signed by its
owner, John A. Truitt, attesting that he believed the properties foreclosed
upon were worth closer to $12 million.375 The trial court denied Jatex’s
motion, excluded Mr. Truitt’s declaration, and granted NPG’s cross-mo-
tion for summary judgment.376
On appeal, Jatex asserted that Mr. Truitt’s opinion regarding the value
of the mineral estate was admissible under the “Property Owner
Rule.”377 The court explained that, under the Property Owner Rule, a
365. 573 S.W.3d 198, 199 (Tex. 2019).
366. 483 S.W.3d 870, 872 (Tex. 2016).
367. Jatex Oil & Gas Expl. LP v. Nadel & Gussman Permian, LLC, No. 11-17-00265-
CV, 2020 WL 4873836, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland, Aug. 20, 2020, no pet.).
368. Id.
369. Id. at *1.
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property owner is generally qualified to testify as to the value of his prop-
erty even if he is not an expert and would not otherwise be qualified to
testify to the value of other property.378 “The rule is based on the pre-
sumption that an owner will be familiar with his own property and know
its value.”379 Entities can prove the value of their property through of-
ficers or employees.380
However, the appellate court held that the Property Owner Rule does
not extend to matters that are of a technical or specialized nature.381 The
court held that valuation of mineral reserves in this case constituted ex-
pert opinion evidence because it requires a “technical, specialized nature
of . . . valuation” that “is based on special knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education in a particular subject.”382 The court also reasoned
that Mr. Truitt’s written opinion itself was in the nature of alleged expert
opinion testimony, as it was highly technical: he claimed he possessed
“expertise,” the testimony criticized the valuations performed by NPG’s
expert, and he cited to technical publications for a variety of technical
acronyms.383
Because Mr. Truitt’s opinions constituted expert testimony, they should
have been disclosed in discovery.384 To the contrary, prior to the motions
for summary judgment, Jatex actually “undesignated” Mr. Truitt as an
expert in valuation and during his deposition, Mr. Truitt testified that he
had not performed a valuation of the mineral interests.385 The court also
held that Mr. Truitt’s testimony failed to provide a sufficient description
of his analysis so the court could determine reliability, and the explana-
tions he gave reflected too great of an analytical gap.386 For instance, Tru-
itt’s opinion was devoid of supporting data for his calculations, and his
entire opinion was set out in just two pages that were largely filled by just
two charts.387 Accordingly, the court held that his opinion testimony was
not admissible as expert testimony, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by striking Truitt’s valuation from summary judgment
evidence.388
The significance of this case is the court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s
attempt to use the Property Owner Rule to offer lay testimony regarding
valuation of mineral reserves. Another notable aspect is the court’s hold-
ing that, even if the Property Owner Rule was applicable, the testimony
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is not uncommon for mineral and royalty owners to attempt to use the
Property Owner Rule in connection with evidence of the alleged value of
the underlying minerals. Going forward, parties seeking to rely upon the
Property Owner Rule in oil and gas cases may claim this case was limited
to the nature of opinions offered by Mr. Truitt. On the other hand, oppo-
nents seeking to defeat the use of the Property Owner Rule may seek to
characterize this case as holding that valuation of mineral reserves is al-
ways a matter of expert testimony.
VIII. SURFACE USE, ACCOMMODATION, AND DAMAGES
A. EVANS RESOURCES, LP V. DIAMONDBACK E&P, LLC
This case addressed whether a lessee was required to pay “location
damages” for horizontal well locations under an oil and gas lease and
related surface use agreement when the lessee conducted a survey and
placed stakes on the land but did not actually commence drilling or con-
duct any further operations for the wells.389
The oil and gas lease and related surface agreement at issue required
the lessee to pay the lessor location damages “prior to commencing drill-
ing operations” for seven pre-identified vertical wells.390 A subsequent
amendment to the surface agreement allowed the drilling of “extended
length horizontal wells” with surface locations on the land at issue.391 The
amendment stated that, “for each [horizontal well] constructed on the
[l]and,” the lessee was required to pay location damages “in advance” in
the amount of $500,000.00 each.392
The Eleventh Eastland Court of Appeals held that, under the terms of
the surface agreement and its amendment, the location damages were not
due upon execution of the agreement, but rather “in advance” of the
“purpose requiring payment,” being when the lessee “utilized” the land
for the “construction” of a horizontal well location.393 Because the
amendment did not define “construction,” the court looked to the “com-
mon, ordinary meaning,” which is “to make or form by combining or ar-
ranging parts or elements.”394 The appellate court held that this meant
the lessee was only required to pay the “location damages” once the
lessee “moved the necessary parts or elements of the [horizontal well] on
to the [l]and.”395 The court held that the lessee’s action of conducting a
survey and laying stakes on the ground did not trigger this payment obli-
gation.396 Further, the agreements did not define “utilize,” and the court
indicated the common meaning of the term is “to make use of: to turn to
389. Evans Res., LP v. Diamondback E&P, LLC, No. 11-18-00128-CV, 2020 WL
2838529, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 29, 2020, pet. denied).
390. Id. at *2.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at *6.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at *8.
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practical use or account.”397 The court held that surveying and placing
stakes was not utilizing the land for the purpose of construction.398 There-
fore, no “location payment” was due under these agreements when the
lessee surveyed and staked the horizontal wells.399
The court made some reference to the underlying oil and gas lease,
which provided a narrow, express definition of “commencement of a
well,” defined as the spudding in of a well with a drilling rig capable of
drilling to a depth of 10,000 feet below the surface.400 In a footnote, the
court noted that “instruments pertaining to the same transaction may be
read together to ascertain the parties’ intent . . . [t]herefore, we may look
to the Lease to ascertain the parties’ agreement.”401
The significance of this case is the analysis of a provision requiring pay-
ment upon “utilizing” land for “construction” of a horizontal well. Leases
and other agreements in oil and gas commonly define deadlines and con-
ditions by reference to the commencement of certain phases of drilling
operations, such as “commence drilling operations” or “operations for
drilling.”402 This case adds to that body of law, most obviously with re-
spect to the terms “construction” and “utilize.” Parties seeking to argue
for a later deadline may argue that this case holds that the terms “con-
struction” and “utilize” refer to operations going beyond preparatory ac-
tivity, whereas opponents to that viewpoint may argue that this holding
was limited to the facts of this case, including the fact that the underlying
oil and gas lease provided a narrow definition of “commencing of drilling
operations.”
IX. EASEMENTS AND CONDEMNATION DISPUTES
A. ATMOS ENERGY CORP. V. PAUL
In this case, the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a “blan-




400. Id. at *5.
401. Id. at n.4 (internal citations omitted).
402. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 618 (2020) (discussing dis-
putes regarding the meaning of phrases such as “drilling operations,” “commencement of
drilling operations,” “commencement of a well,” and the like); see also Andrew J. Cloutier
& Jeremy Webb, Ready, Set, Commence: Commencement Clauses in the 21st Century, 64
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 28-1 (2018) (discussing variations on commencement provisions
in oil and gas leases); Valence Operating Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 S.W.3d
435, 441–42 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (discussing whether a lessee’s activities
preliminary to actual drilling was sufficient to meet to the obligation to “actually com-
mence work on the proposed operation”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267, 272
(Tex. 1960) (holding that “the commencement of the well does not mean actual drilling. It
is sufficient if preparations to drill are being made, such as making and clearing a location
and delivering equipment to the well site.”); Bargsley v. Pryor Petroleum Corp., 196
S.W.3d 823, 826 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (holding that long-stroking an
existing well, laying pipeline, doing electrical work, installing flow lines, and replacing a
tank “were not preliminary to the actual work of drilling”).
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the additional pipelines along the same route as the initial pipeline, but
rather the grantee was permitted to lay the additional pipeline anywhere
upon the entire tract so long as its location does not unreasonably inter-
fere with grantor’s property rights.403
The dispute stems from a right-of-way and easement granted in 1960 on
a 137-acre tract for the purpose of “construct[ing], maintain[ing] and
operat[ing] pipe lines.”404 Soon after the initial conveyance, the grantee
constructed its initial line parallel to the southern border of the tract.405
Decades later, in 2017, Atmos Energy Corp. (Atmos)—the successor-in-
interest of the 1960 grantee—intended to construct a second pipeline
along a markedly different route on the other side of the property.406
However, Paul—the successor-in-interest of the 1960 grantor—denied
Atmos access to the property.407 Atmos filed suit against Paul for breach
of the right-of-way and easement agreement.408
At trial, Paul moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 1960
easement agreement only permitted the creation of “one ‘right of way
and easement’” that “allows for multiple pipelines, [but] not multiple
easements.”409 The trial court granted Paul’s summary judgment motion
and Atmos appealed.410
The appellate court noted that the easement agreement was a “blanket
easement” because the legal description only described a burdened tract
but not a route for the easement.411 The court noted that the deed’s
granting clause used the plural form of the word “pipe lines.”412 Paul
relied on the prior Texas Supreme Court holding in Houston Pipe Line
Co. v. Dwyer, which held that the route of a blanket easement is estab-
lished by the construction of a pipeline.413 The appellate court distin-
guished Dwyer because the deed in that case provided for the
construction of a single pipeline, but Dwyer was not determinative of the
location of subsequent pipelines such as in this case.414 The court also
rejected Paul’s argument that the deed must expressly permit “multiple
routes” in order to allow multiple routes.415 The court explained that
Texas law does not impose any such strict requirement to use that
language.416
403. Atmos Energy Corp. v. Paul, 598 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, no
pet.).
404. Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
405. Id.
406. Id. at 439.
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409. Id. at 440.
410. Id. at 442.
411. Id. at 446.
412. Id. at 447.
413. Id. at 449–50 (citing Hous. Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662, 665–66 (Tex.
1964)).
414. Id. at 451.
415. Id. at 452–53.
416. Id. at 456.
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The court held that the easement agreement did not restrict the loca-
tion of the second pipeline to the same route as the first pipeline.417 How-
ever, the court stated the grantee’s ability to construct the second
pipeline on any part of the property was not without its limitations.418
The court made note of the “reasonable necessity test” that applies to all
such Texas easement cases.419 Under Texas law, a grant or reservation of
an easement in general terms implies a grant of unlimited “reasonable
use,” such as is “reasonably necessary and convenient and as little bur-
densome as possible to the servient owner.”420
The significance of this case is the interpretation of “blanket ease-
ments” and the scope of a blanket easement with reference to a second
pipeline, which the court held was not necessarily required to follow the
same route as the first pipeline.
B. DCP SAND HILLS PIPELINE, LLC V. SAN MIGUEL ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC.
San Miguel is an electric cooperative fueling its power plant by virtue
of a lignite strip mine lease located on a 2200-acre tract in McMullen
County.421 This legal dispute arose when DCP Sand Hills Pipeline, LLC
(DCP), a common carrier, negotiated a series of pipeline easements with
the surface owners of the 2200-acre tract.422 San Miguel argued that
DCP’s easement was void and that San Miguel’s rights were superior be-
cause DCP’s second pipeline on the 2200-acre tract would allegedly inter-
fere with San Miguel’s future mining obligations.423
San Miguel brought an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act (UDJA) seeking, among other things, a declaration that: (1)
DCP’s pipeline easement was void to the extent it interfered with San
Miguel’s rights under the lignite lease, and (2) San Miguel’s rights under
the lease were superior to DCP’s easement rights.424 DCP asserted a
counterclaim to condemn the land covered by its pipeline easement.425
DCP also argued that San Miguel’s lignite lease was invalid and that San
Miguel’s attempt to seek attorney’s fees under the UDJA was improper
because San Miguel claims were really a trespass to try title claim.426
The court of appeals started by analyzing whether the UDJA was the
proper vehicle to determine whether San Miguel’s rights were superior to
417. Id. at 447.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 447–48.
420. Id. at 448.
421. DCP Sand Hills Pipeline, LLC v. San Miguel Elec. Coop., Inc., No. 04-19-00288-
CV, 2020 WL 4607062, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 12, 2020) sub. op., op. with-
drawn, reh’g denied, No. 04-19-00288-CV, 2020 WL 4607062, at *1 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Nov. 18, 2020).
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DCP’s rights.427 DCP argued that determining the superiority of rights
required the court to determine title to real property and, as such, re-
quired the claim to be brought under the trespass to try title statute.428
The court disagreed.429 While trespass to try title is the proper statute to
determine the validity or superiority of possessory rights in real property,
it does not apply when a claimant seeks to establish the validity of an
easement, which is a non-possessory interest in real property.430
DCP also argued that San Miguel failed to establish the validity of its
lignite lease because it failed to present evidence of delay rentals for one
period of time and the evidence showed underpayments of delay rentals
for another period of time.431 The court rejected this argument, holding
that San Miguel presented evidence that explained the underpayments,
and DCP failed to present any evidence.432 Rather, DCP merely cited its
own pleadings, to which the court noted “[p]leadings are not proper sum-
mary judgment evidence.”433
Turning to DCP’s condemnation counterclaim, where San Miguel ar-
gued condemnation was not available because the land had already been
devoted to a public use—San Miguel’s use as a lignite mine to fuel its
power plant—and therefore, under the “paramount importance doc-
trine,” DCP could not condemn the land for a different public use.434
The court explained that the paramount importance doctrine prevents
condemnation by a common carrier when it is shown that: (1) the prop-
erty is already devoted to a public use, and (2) the condemnation would
practically destroy or materially interfere with the use to which it has
been devoted.435 As for the first prong, the court found that a fact issue
existed as to whether the pipeline would materially interfere with San
Miguel’s existing public use.436 The evidence showed that San Miguel was
not actually mining the 2200-acre tract when DCP acquired its easements,
and though San Miguel had conducted numerous studies of the land in
1975, San Miguel had not applied for a permit to mine the area where the
easement would be located until after DCP installed the pipeline.437
Thus, San Miguel did not prove, as a matter of law, that it had an “ex-
isting” use.438
Regarding the second prong, the court held that San Miguel did not
prove, as a matter of law, that DCP’s condemnation would practically
destroy or materially interfere with San Miguel’s strip mining opera-
427. Id. at *3.
428. Id.
429. Id. at *4.
430. Id.
431. Id.
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tion.439 The court noted that the summary judgment evidence reflected
that DCP’s pipeline would only sterilize between 10–14% of San Miguel’s
lignite.440 When considering practical destruction or material interfer-
ence, the court looks to the entire use of the affected property, not a
portion of its use.441
The significance of this case is the analysis of the paramount impor-
tance doctrine in relation to a dispute between an oil and gas pipeline and
a lignite mining operation by an electric cooperative.
C. SOUTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER CO. V. LYNCH
In this case, the Texas Supreme Court addressed a dispute as to
whether a utility easement was limited to a fixed width of thirty feet, or
whether it was limited to a reasonably necessary width.442 Southwestern
Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) claimed that, because the instru-
ment granted a general easement with no fixed width, no width restric-
tions could be placed on their allowed use of the land.443 The landowner
argued that SWEPCO’s historical use of the easement fixed the width at
thirty feet.444
The landowners sought declaration from the court that the width of the
easement be fixed to thirty feet based on SWEPCO’s historical use of the
easement.445 Rather than construing the easement as a general easement,
intentionally omitting a defined width, both the trial court (having al-
lowed extrinsic evidence of SWEPCO’s historical use) and the appellate
court held that SWEPCO’s historical use fixed the easement at thirty
feet.446
The supreme court held that, because the instrument granted a general
easement, the grantee was entitled to access, in a reasonable manner, as
much of the property as reasonably necessary to maintain the transmis-
sion line.447 The court held that the lack of a specified width in the instru-
ment did not mean the instrument was ambiguous, and that it did not
open the door to the admission of extrinsic evidence of historical use.448
The supreme court emphasized the utility of general easements for pur-
poses of contracting around anticipated developments in technology and
accounting for such changes by not fixing a specific easement width.449
Doing so is a strategic decision made between the parties, which should
not be disturbed by the admission of extrinsic evidence showing historical
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at *5.
442. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. 2020).
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444. See id.
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446. Id. at 682.
447. Id. at 690.
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use, and was improperly admitted by the lower courts.450
The court noted that, although the width of the easement was not fixed,
the landowner was not without recourse because the grantee could only
use the property in a reasonable manner and only to an extent that is
reasonably necessary to enjoy its rights under the easement.451
The significance of this case is the supreme court’s analysis of so-called
“general easements,” which do not express a fixed width; its holding that
a general easement is not ambiguous merely for omitting a width from
the instrument; and its holding that the permissible width of a general
easement is that which is reasonably necessary for the permissible use of
the easement. Further, this case is interesting in its explanation of the
utility of general easements, in that they allow for changes in technology.
X. CONTRACTOR/SUBCONTRACTOR DISPUTES
A. PEARL RESOURCES, LLC V. CHARGER SERVICES, LLC
In this case, the Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals upheld a quantum
meruit award for emergency work performed by a dirt work company.452
Pearl Resources and Pearl Operating were affiliated companies that
owned working interests in an oil and gas property in Pecos County,
Texas.453 They entered into a Turnkey Drilling Contract with PDS Drill-
ing.454 Shortly after drilling began, a blowout occurred, causing fresh-
water, hydrogen sulfide, and other contaminants to begin erupting out of
the well and migrating towards a significant irrigation system.455
An employee for PDS’s drilling subcontractor, Bison Drilling, called a
dirt work company, Charger Services, LLC (Charger), informed Charger
of the emergency need to contain the runoff, and asked Charger to begin
work immediately.456 Charger mobilized equipment and a foreman the
same night.457 Not long after the emergency clean-up began, Pearl’s drill-
ing contractor, PDS, left the site.458 During the containment efforts, the
Railroad Commission assumed control while Pearl’s representatives
served as the Commission’s “eyes and ears,” which included attending
remediation meetings.459
Charger initially sent its invoice to the drilling contractor, PDS, rather
than to Pearl.460 After Charger’s invoices remained unpaid for nearly a
year, Charger sent a demand for payment directly to Pearl.461 Ultimately,
450. Id.
451. Id.
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Charger filed a lawsuit against Pearl.462 After a bench trial, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of Charger based on quantum meruit.463
On appeal, Pearl raised numerous arguments. First, Pearl argued that
an implied contract existed between Charger and PDS, which precluded a
quantum meruit claim against Pearl.464 Pearl argued this implied contract
was created when PDS’s subcontractor, Bison was hired by PDS and ac-
ted as its agent in procuring Charger’s services.465 The appellate court
acknowledged that, if an implied contract was formed between Charger
and PDS for the work performed, Charger would be precluded from
seeking quantum meruit against Pearl because a party generally cannot
recover in quantum meruit when a valid contract covers the same transac-
tion.466 However, the court rejected Pearl’s implied contract defense in
this case because there was no evidence of an implied contract between
Charger and PDS.467 In reaching that conclusion, the court held that
there was no evidence that Bison was acting as an agent for PDS, no
evidence that Bison had the authority to extend an offer on behalf of
PDS, and no evidence regarding the essential terms of any purported
contract between Charger and PDS.468
Pearl argued that there was not sufficient evidence that it was on rea-
sonable notice that Charger expected to be paid by Pearl.469 The court
rejected that argument, pointing to testimony from two of Charger’s own-
ers that they believed it is customary in the industry for emergency sub-
contractors to look to the operator or lessee for payment.470 The
appellate court pointed to precedent holding that evidence of industry
custom can be relevant in a quantum meruit case to imply that the owner
should have known that payment was expected.471 The court also ex-
plained that industry custom was not being used in this case to alter the
terms of a contract between Pearl and PDS but rather, to address the
separate rights and obligations between Pearl and Charger.472 The court
also noted evidence that Pearl took over operations after the blowout,
Pearl was a sophisticated mineral company, and there was no evidence of
a reason for Pearl to believe Charger was doing the work for free.473
Pearl also argued Charger provided the services for the benefit of PDS
and not for the benefit of Pearl.474 The court rejected that argument, ex-
plaining that the evidence showed that Charger knew that Pearl was the
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operator prior to arriving at the site and the services provided a value to
Pearl.475 Pearl also pointed out that Charger first sought payment from
PDS rather than Pearl.476 The court rejected that argument, explaining
that did not mean Charger did not provide the services for Pearl’s
benefit.477
Pearl also argued that there was no sufficient evidence that Pearl ac-
cepted Charger’s services.478 Pearl argued that the evidence merely
showed that Pearl was on site and that Pearl did not object.479 The court
rejected those arguments, pointing out that acceptance can be proven in
quantum meruit cases by presenting evidence that the defendant knew of
the services and did not object.480 The court pointed to evidence in the
record that Pearl had representatives on site providing regular updates
regarding remediation effort and that Pearl was required to take over
operations following the blowout.481
The significance of this case is the holding that industry custom is ad-
missible for purposes of reflecting that emergency services subcontractors
customarily look to the owner for payment. This case also serves as an
illustration of the complexities that can arise in oil and gas quantum me-
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